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Spare parts pricing by defense contractors has received
considerable attention since 1983 when overpricing cases were widely
publicized. Efforts to resolve the overpricing problem focused
primarily on requirements determination, technical design, source
of supply, and cost allocation methods constrained by existing
accounting structures. Other methods of improving spares prices
might be identified if accounting structures could be varied.
This research examines the accounting structure and spares pricing
method of a single defense contractor to determine if establishment
of a separate spare parts cost center within the cost accounting
structure would improve the spares pricing process.
The research determined that the spares cost center does not
correct the inaccuracies in spares pricing introduced by the con-
tractor's accounting structure. An alternative cost center struc-
ture, using functional cost centers, does provide a potential




B. FOCUS OF RESEARCH 7
C. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH 8
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 9
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY '
. . . . 9
F. SCOPE OF THE STUDY 10
G. LIMITATIONS 11
H. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 12
II. THE SPARE PARTS PRICING ENVIRONMENT 13
A. INTRODUCTION 13
B. THE FORMULA PRICING CONCEPT 14
C. THE CONTRACTOR'S SPARE PARTS PRICING
METHOD 20
D. THE CONTRACTOR'S COST ACCOUNTING SYSTEM ... 24
III. THE COST CENTER CONCEPT 27
A. INTRODUCTION 27
B. THE SPARE PARTS COST CENTER STRUCTURE .... 23
C. AN ALTERNATIVE COST CENTER STRUCTURE 33
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES 36
A. ACCOUNTING ISSUES RELATED TO SPARE PARTS
PRICING 36
B. ANALYSIS OF THE SPARE PARTS COST CENTER ... 38
1. Accounting/Organization Structure
Issues 38
2. Spare Parts Pricing Issues 39
4






2. Spare Parts Pricing Issues 40
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 44
A. CONCLUSIONS 44
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 45
C. ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND
SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS 46
1 . The Research Question 46
2. The Subsidiary Questions 47






PRINCIPAL CLASSES OF MATERIALS AND
SERVICE COSTS CHARGED AS DIRECT
MATERIALS
APPENDIX D: INDIRECT COST POOLS
LIST OF REFERENCES









The spare parts procurement process within the Department of
Defense (DOD) came under intense Congressional and public scrutiny
and news media exposure beginning early in 1983 with the uncovering
of specific instances in which DOD contracting officers bought
parts at exorbitant prices. Initial explanations of the causes
of the problems and assurances by DOD procurement officials that
the problems were isolated cases did not satisfy Congress.
As Congressional and news media pressure continued to build, DOD
began serious efforts to identify and correct the problems which
allowed the overpricing to take place. The cases cited in media
and Congressional reports associated the problem with current
pricing practices. DOD studies had documented the existence
of problems with spare parts pricing, exhibiting the same symptoms,
in 1963 [Ref. 1: pp. ii,iii]. DOD-wide programs were introduced
as early as November 1964 covering breakout of certain spare parts
from major systems contracts in order to buy parts directly
from manufacturers to obtain lower prices [Ref. 2: p. 84].
This initiative was revised and expanded in June 1983 as one of
the early significant elements of a new major spare parts reform
effort by DOD. Shortly afterward, the Secretary of Defense
issued first, a ten point plan and then, a twenty-five point plan
to deal with continuing spare parts pricing difficulties [Refs.
3,4].
Today, over two years after the Secretary of Defense issued
his plans, the basic problem, cited in 1963 and again identified
in 1983, of pricing parts consistent with effort expended by
manufacturers remains to be solved completely. Despite the close
scrutiny of spare parts acquisitions by contracting officers,
heads of agency contracting activities, requiring activities, and
higher levels of management within DOD, defense auditors and
Congressional staffs continue to uncover spare parts pricing
irregularities. The application, by contractors, of cost allocation
formulas to price contract line items, without regard to whether
the resultant prices coincide with the intrinsic values of the
items, has been blamed in many cases. Aside from creating a
negative public image of the DOD contracting process, the problems
still surfacing show that the process is not yet conserving
scarce spare parts dollars to the satisfaction of Congress or the
public. Preliminary investigation by -the researcher indicates
that past research of spare parts pricing focused predominantly
on allocation of costs constrained by the existing accounting
structures of defense contractors studied. Additional means, not
previously considered, of improving the accuracy of spare parts
pricing methods might be identified if the accounting structure
could be changed rather than having it act as a constraint on the
cost allocation process.
B. FOCUS OF RESEARCH
Many different pricing methods are used by DOD contractors to
price spare parts. The spare parts pricing method used by a
major defense
. contractor was analyzed in light of the corporate
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accounting structure to determine the impact that establishment
of a separate cost center for spare parts would have on the
pricing of spare parts under DOD contracts. This spare parts
cost center concept calls for reshaping the corporate accounting
structure to segregate the spare parts function as a separate
accounting element. The spare parts pricing method currently used
by the contractor studied, a form of formula pricing, relies upon
rates included in a negotiated forward pricing rate agreement
to assign portions of indirect costs to each contract line item
being priced. Typically, indirect costs are applied as a percentage
of all or part of the direct costs or labor hours used in the
manufacturing process for the item. For items which are being
sold to DOD by a contractor who is not the manufacturer, indirect
costs are applied as a percentage of the price paid to the
source which provided the item to the contractor. The cost
accounting structure drives historical cost accumulation which
forms the basis for negotiating forward pricing rates.
C. OBJECTIVES OF RESEARCH
The principal objective of the study was to determine whether
the establishment of a spare parts cost center by DOD contractors
could be a means of improving spare parts pricing and the image
that Congress and the public have of this subset of Government
procurement. The researcher sought to determine whether the
spare parts cost center could be used to improve the accuracy of
historical cost accumulation, would provide a more accurate
method of spare parts pricing which still satisfied government
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Cost Accounting Standards, and would generate prices which more
correctly reflected intrinsic value than current pricing methods.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question was:
Would the establishment of a spare parts cost center within
the corporate accounting structure improve the process of pricing
spare parts so that the ultimate prices charged would be
consistent with the contractor's effort to produce them?
Subsidiary research questions were:
1. Would a spare parts cost center fit into the existing corporate
accounting structure of the contractor studied?
2. What are the major obstacles to establishing a spare parts
cost center?
3. How would costs associated with manufacturing spare parts
under a separate cost center differ from costs determined under
the current accounting structure?
4. Would such a cost center comply with Cost Accounting Standards?
5. What incentives might be provided to DOD contractors to
motivate them to adopt this accounting structure, if feasible
and advantageous?
6. What effect would the establishment of a separate cost
center for spare parts have on the contractor's ability to
recover overhead costs?
7. Would the establishment of a separate cost center for spare
parts lead to any cost efficiencies, such as reductions in
total overhead costs?
3. What would be the implications concerning present corporate
structure and/or management practices of establishing a
separate cost center for spare parts cost accumulation?
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The literature concerning spare parts pricing was studied to
determine what cost elements form the current cost base from
which price is derived. Interviews were conducted with, and data
obtained from, appropriate representatives of the Naval Supply
Systems Command, a major defense contractor and its associated
Navy or Defense Contract Administration Service Plant Representative
Office and Defense Contract Audit Agency Resident Auditor, and a
second defense contractor which recently had conducted extensive
research concerning application of a cost center approach to
defense contract pricing. Information and data gathered were
used to develop a representative structure for the spare parts
cost center. This structure was compared to the existing cost
accounting structure and the associated spare parts pricing
method for the contractor studied.
F. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
Specific areas investigated were the method used to assign
costs to each element of spare parts prices by a major defense
contractor, the cost accounting structure of this contractor,
major obstacles to establishing a spare parts cost center within
this contractor's cost accounting structure, and the usefulness
of the spare parts cost center as a means of resolving the spare
parts pricing problem.
The study did not encompass all pricing methods for spare
parts nor all cost accounting systems currently used by DOD
contractors. Rather, the pricing method and cost accounting
system used by the contractor studied were used as a representative
test bed for application of the spare parts cost center concept.
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G. LIMITATIONS
The researcher found that much of the cost and pricing infor-
mation needed to research fully the spare parts pricing methods
used by a specific defense contractor was proprietary. The
contractor selected for the case study made necessary information
available under specific limitations:
1. The contractor was not to be identified in the study.
2. No information was to be attributed to the contractor or
its employees in a manner which would permit identification
of the contractor.
3. Information was to be disguised sufficiently to prevent
identification of the contractor from the format of the
information.
Therefore, the defense contractor studied will be identified
simply as "the contractor" throughout this thesis.
The researcher agreed to these limitations in order to gain
full access to necessary information. The researcher views the
limitations to be facilitators of information flow which do not
jeopardize the validity of the information or any conclusions
drawn from analysis of it. Preparation of the thesis within the
bounds of the limitations provides the benefit of permitting
unlimited distribution of the study among appropriate parties
within both DOD and the defense industry.
The general izabil ity of this research may be limited by the
use of a case study approach in which a single defense contractor's
systems and methods are analyzed. However, a 1985 survey of 15
major defense contractors showed 67% using the same basic system
of overhead cost allocation as the contractor studied [Ref. 53.
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H. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter II describes the spare parts pricing system used by
the contractor, including the individual elements which make
up a spare parts price. Cost flow through the contractor's
cost accounting system is described in relation to the spares
pricing system. Chapter III defines the cost center concept and
discusses the application of the spare parts cost center concept,
and then, an alternative cost center concept, to the contractor's
cost accounting structure and spares pricing function. Chapter IV
provides an analysis of the issues presented. The last chapter
draws conclusions and makes specific recommendations resulting
from the research effort. Summary answers to the research question
and subsidiary questions and recommendations for future study
complete this chapter. Definitions useful in understanding
terminology used throughout the thesis are listed in Appendix A.
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II. THE SPARE PARTS PRICING ENVIRONMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
Spare parts pricing methods used by major defense contractors
are a reflection of the complexity of modern defense systems
which contain thousands of individual parts [Ref. 6:p. 28],
These parts are aggregated into components, subsystems, and,
finally, complete weapon systems. Each part has an estimated
service life, usually based upon either observation of the part
in previous applications or extensive testing during development
of the current system. When these estimates of service life for
parts are coupled with the planned useful life of the system,
program planners can predict the quantities of each part required
as initial spare parts to be acquired with the system. As actual
parts usage information is generated, after the system becomes
operational, replenishment spare parts are purchased in appropriate
quantities to keep the system in the desired operational condition
and to maintain spare parts inventories.
A defense contractor may be requested initially to provide
spare parts as a portion of the contract for delivery of a complete
weapon system. The request may consist of thousands of parts
which, in today's environment, must be priced individually in a
contract bid or proposal. At the other extreme, the follow-on
requestSj after the weapon system has been fielded, may be for a
small quantity of a single item to meet an immediate operational
requirement. Formula pricing has evolved as a means by which
13
defense contractors can deal with these situations. For multiple-
item requests, formula pricing provides a mechanism which will
allow a contractor to price a large number of line items without
the need for detailed individual estimates of each input to the
manufacturing process for each part. This results in reduced
manpower costs for the contractor and, ultimately, lower overhead
costs for the government. For the immediate, single-line-item
requests, formula pricing expedites the process of providing
price quotations to the government, thus reducing the total time
required to restore operational capability of vital weapon systems.
From these perspectives, formula pricing provides a frequently
desired benefit to the government, in the form of time savings,
when compared with a pricing system which requires individual
estimates of each element of price for each line item.
B. THE FORMULA PRICING CONCEPT
Formula pricing is a concept designed to avoid the inefficient,
labor-intensive process of cost element detailing, starting with
the procurement of material and following the part as it goes
through manufacturing, inspection, packaging, and shipping.
Formula pricing begins with estimated costs of the direct material
and direct manufacturing labor needed to produce a part. Total
cost results when other direct expenses incident to manufactur-
ing the product, indirect expenses such as material scrappage and
material handling, and manufacturing overhead are included.
Profit is added to give a proposed selling price. [Ref. 7:p. 8B91
The key aspect of formula pricing which makes the concept
useful and more efficient than detailed estimating is the application
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of previously agreed-to factors or percentages for indirect
expenses and profit to the material and labor estimated for each
part. These factors or percentages are included as part of
forward pricing rate agreements which DOD negotiates with most
major defense contractors. If estimates of basic costs—materials
and labor--are realistic, formula pricing should produce an
accurate total price for a large group of items [Ref. 7:p. 8B10],
However, formula pricing has been criticized for two major reasons:
1. The method is unable to price items individually with
sufficient accuracy for the prices to stand alone when indirect
costs are distributed in equal amounts to each contract
line item.
2. Prices resulting from strict application of formulas do not
reflect intrinsic value of the items priced.
In one of the early spare parts overpricing cases, DOD paid
$110 each for two diodes available from the Federal Supply System
for 4 cents each. This situation resulted from using formula
pricing on a request for two line items, the two diodes and six
power supplies, bought from a major defense contractor who was
not the manufacturer of the parts [Ref. 6:pp. 28-291. Table I
illustrates the manner in which formula pricing was applied to
generate the $110.34 unit price for the diodes. In Example A of
Table I, material handling labor costs were charged based upon a
pre-negotiated quantity and rate to be applied in an equal amount
to each line item being purchased. Although the prenegotiated
quantity and rate may have reflected accurately the historical
average material handling costs incurred per purchased line item,
the use of average costs distorts the price of the relatively





Material Handling Labor Cost
Distributed Equally Between Contract Line Items
Diode Power Supply
Purchased Parts (2/$. 04) $ .08 (6/$100) $ 600.00
Direct Labor Hours
9.0 @ $18.00 = $162.00 81.00 81.00Overhead
94% of Value Added 76.14 76.14
Total Cost Input $157.22 $ 757.14
G&A @ 21% 33.02 159.00
Total Cost $190~24 $ 916~14
Profit @ 16% 30.44 146.58
Total Price $220~68 $1062.72
Unit Price $110.34 $ 177.12
Contract Price $1283.40
Example B
Material Handling Labor Cost
Prorated on Basis of Total Purchased Parts Cost
Diode Power Supply
Purchased Parts (2/$. 04) $ .08 (6/$100) $ 600.00
Direct Labor Hours
9.0 @ $18.00 = $162.00 .02 161.98Overhead
94% of Value Added .02 152.26
Total Cost Input $ . 12 $ 914.24
G&A @ 21% .03 191.99
Total Cost $ .15 $1106.23




Unit Price $ 213.87
Contract Price $1283.40
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effort was expended. A reallocation of the same quantity of
material handling labor hours on the basis of total purchased
parts cost, as in Example B, results in more reasonable and
believable unit prices, although the combined total price for
both requested line items is the same in either example. The
loss of unit price integrity, as in Example A, has been described
as "apparent overpricing" as opposed to "real overpricing" since
the contractor was entitled under the Cost Accounting Standards
and DOD cost regulations to recover the costs included in the
distorted unit price [Ref. 6:p. 27]. However, the perception of
Congress and the public that contractors were overcharging the
government made application of equal allocation methods in con-
junction with formula pricing, which caused the unit price dis-
tortions, unacceptable.
In February 1984, DOD established a policy which required use
of value based cost allocation and prohibited use of equal allocation
methods which assigned indirect costs in equal amounts to each
part ordered [Ref. 2:p. 30], Consistent enforcement of this
policy should prevent the recurrence of apparent overpricing as
described and restore unit price integrity to spare parts included
as line items in DOD contracts.
Another aspect of the $110 diode case and other spare parts
overpricing cases examined point to a more common problem which
has not been resolved. When pricing formulas are applied to
spare parts which the contractor does not manufacture, but buys
from vendors or subcontractors, the resulting prices exceed the
intrinsic value of the parts. A reasonable approximation of
17
intrinsic value is the lowest commercial price or the market
price for which an item could be purchased in a competitive
environment. The implication is that if DOD could buy a part
directly from a manufacturer under competitive conditions, DOD
normally would pay a price which approximates intrinsic value.
In contrast, if the same part is bought by DOD from a major
system contractor such as the contractor being studied, who is
not the manufacturer, the allocation of additional costs by the
contractor to the part would raise the price to some amount above
intrinsic value. This increase in price has been estimated to
average about 30 percent over a competitive market price. [Ref.
8:p. 19]. For the contractor, this percentage ranges from 7
percent to 38 percent depending upon the type of contract used to
buy the parts—either cost plus a fixed fee or firm-fixed price--and
the point of delivery of the parts [Ref. 93.
The highly publicized $436 hammer is an extreme example
which illustrates how a spare part price can become distorted
from intrinsic value when a major system contractor applies all
allowable and allocable costs to the basic price of the part.
Table II shows the price of a common sledge hammer growing from
$7 to $436 as Gould, Simulation Systems Division, applied its
pricing formula [Ref. 10:p. 11]
Gould expended little engineering and no manufacturing
effort in providing the hammer to the government. Whether the
intrinsic value of the hammer increased as the item passed through
the contractor's facility is at the heart of the present spares







Cost Element Hours Amount
$ 7Direct Material
Material Packaging 1











Total Engineering Support 26 37















Total Manufacturing Support 78 93
Manufacturing Overhead @ 110% 102
Total Cost Input 283
General & Administrative (G&A) @ 31 8% 90
Total Cost 373
Fee (Profit) 56
Facilities Capital Cost of Money 7
Total Price $ 436
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hammer is still seven dollars, while defense contractor repre-
sentatives believe that the value of the hammer has been increased
by some amount through Gould's efforts. Gould's contribution to
the part's value consisted of accumulating a number of tools,
including the hammer, to be provided to the government as a
repair kit which supported a major weapon system [Ref. 10:pp.
12-131. A portion of the price increase can be supported by the
company's efforts in identifying what tools to include in the
repair kit, purchasing the items, and assembling the repair kit.
However, most of the price increase is the result of including
some amount of all categories of company costs in the spare parts
price, even though the incurrence of the costs in some categories
was unrelated to the spare parts order. Although the spare parts
breakout initiative was intended to resolve this problem, the
military services continue to buy many parts from major system
contractors, which are not the manufacturers, for a multitude of
reasons including security and quality assurance [Ref. 11].
C. THE CONTRACTOR'S SPARE PARTS PRICING METHOD
Spare parts pricing is accomplished by the contractor using a
formula pricing method known as complete factoring [Ref. 7: p.
8B12]. This method simplifies the mechanics of pricing by combining
all separate factors into single factors for material, subcontract,
and labor. The material factor and the subcontract factor are
multiplied by the base materials cost and the subcontract materials
cost, respectively. The labor factor, expressed in terms of
dollaKs per hour, is multiplied by the direct manufacturing labor
hours. The sum of the three resulting dollar amounts is the
20
proposed selling price. For parts which are not manufactured by
the contractor and which require no additional manufacturing
effort or testing upon receipt by the contractor from the supplier,
the contractor applies only the materials factor or the subcontract
factor to determine the proposed selling price. The pricing
factors are negotiated prospectively between the contractor and
the government (through the Administrative Contracting Officer)
using the past three years' historical cost as the basis for the
rates. The negotiated factors are formalized in a forward pricing
rate agreement which is revised when new direct labor rates,
overhead rates, or other element rates take effect. The factor
values, but not the elements of cost, vary according to the type
of contract to be used by the government to buy the parts. [Ref.
9]
Table III provides a breakdown of the price factors into cost
elements and illustrates how the individual factors are summed to
generate the single factors used in the complete factoring method.
The cost elements included in spare parts prices vary with the
source of the parts and with the point of delivery. The source
could be either in-house manufacture by the contractor or purchase
from a supplier or subcontractor. The point of delivery for
purchased items could be either the contractor's facility or the
DOD activity which ordered the parts from the contractor.
The increased emphasis within DOD to buy spare parts directly
from manufacturers rather than from major systems contractors
under the breakout initiative has reduced the numbers of spare
21
TABLE III
SPARE PARTS COST ELEMENTS AND FACTORS
Cost Element
Manufacturing Material /Sub contract
Factor" Factor"*











Other Direct Costs M





Common Minor Material M
Cost of Money M
Total Cost Factor $ xxx.xx
Profit M
M






















Item manufactured by the contractor.
PD : Item purchased by the contractor and shipped by
the supplier to the DOD activity.
PC : Item purchased by the contractor and shipped by
the supplier to the contractor.
* Manufacturing factors are multiplied by the esti-
mated (or actual, if known) total direct manufac-
turing labor hours for the job to obtain the cost
for each element
.
k-k Material / Subcontract factors are multiplied by
the total cost of materials / subcontracted items
for the job to obtain the cost for each element.
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parts being purchased by the contractor for direct resale to
DOD. The sole category of parts being bought by the contractor
for direct resale is made up of system critical items which are
not bought from the manufacturer directly by DOD because of
necessary inspection and certification requirements which the DOD
major system program office requires the contractor to accomplish.
Therefore, the largest portion of the contractor's total spare
parts business with DOD consists of parts which the contractor
manufactures and parts to which the contractor applies additional
manufacturing type effort after obtaining the parts from suppliers.
The cost elements included in prices for these spare parts are
coded in Table III with the letter "M". Cost elements included
in purchased parts are coded "PC" for those shipped by the supplier
to the contractor and "PD" for those shipped directly to the DOD
activity. [Ref. 9]
The pricing method described does not apply to contract
proposals which are over $100,000 in total proposed price or
which are for parts that are obtained through intercompany work
transfers (ICWT). These proposals are priced using a direct
input method which requires individual detailed estimates for
manufacturing, engineering, and quality assurance direct labor
hours. These estimated hours are multiplied by a predetermined
rate for each function. The products are summed to provide a
total labor-based cost to which overheads and G&A expense are
added at predetermined rates. Overtime premium, special test
equipment costs, procurement burden, subcontract material or ICWT
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costs, and Cost of money are added to give total cost. Addition
of profit or fee yields a total proposed price. The contractor
must provide certified cost and pricing data with all proposals
over $100,000. [Ref. 11]
In 1984, the contractor formed an evaluation committee, which
includes the managers of finance and material as members, to
review pricing proposals for spare parts. This committee is
responsible for ensuring that all aspects of the proposal reflect
good business practice and that the proposed prices are fair and
reasonable. The formation of the committee was a direct attempt
to avoid future cases of alleged spare parts overpricing. [Ref.
9] The perceived necessity for such a committee by the contractor
adds credibility to the criticisms of formula pricing listed
previously.
D. THE CONTRACTOR'S COST ACCOUNTING SYSTEM
The contractor uses an actual-cost, job-order-oriented system
of cost accumulation with each job identified by a unique number.
Direct costs are charged to the job as incurred. Most direct
labor is charged to cost objectives using individual hours and
actual individual rates. Direct labor for direct service centers
is allocated to final cost objectives on a weekly basis using the
average service center labor rate for that week. Appendix B
includes a listing of direct service centers along with the major
cost elements and allocation base applicable to each center.
Principal classes of materials and service costs which are charged
as direct materials are listed in Appendix C.
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Indirect costs are distributed to each job on a monthly basis
from the cost pools in which indirect costs have been accumulated
for the past month. The indirect cost pools used by the contractor,
the major cost elements included in each pool and the base for
allocating each pool are listed in Appendix D. The contractor
has three indirect service centers and a number of overhead
service centers which are listed in Appendix B. The costs charged
to these service centers are redistributed to other indirect cost
pools prior to distribution of costs to jobs. On a weekly basis,
the contractor generates a work-in-process ledger which lists
detailed charges for each job for the week and cumulative charges
for each job. Figure 2.1 illustrates the flow of costs from
incurrence through the cost pools and ultimately to the job
orders. For the purpose of spare parts pricing, these accumulated
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III. THE COST CENTER CONCEPT
A. INTRODUCTION
The cost center, a financial management control structure, is
a type of responsibility center. A responsibility center denotes
any organization unit that is headed by a responsible manager.
It uses inputs—materials , labor, and services--to produce outputs,
either goods or services. Normally the transformation of inputs
into outputs is facilitated by working capital, equipment, buildings
and other assets. The goods and services produced by a respon-
sibility center may become inputs to another responsibility
center or may be sold to external customers. [Ref. 12:pp. 194-1951
A cost center, also referred to as an expense center, a cost
pool, or, simply, a department, is a responsibility center for
which only inputs are measured in monetary terms and the manager
is responsibile for controlling inputs, that is, costs or expenses.
This may be contrasted to a profit center, a type of responsibility
center for which both inputs and outputs are measured in monetary
terms and the manager is responsibile for controlling both costs
and revenues. In addition to holding responsibility for cost
efficiency, the cost center manager is responsible for the quality
of the output and the volume of production. [Ref. 12:pp. 198-199]
The process of dividing a business organization (usually a
manufacturing concern) into cost centers or departments to which
expenses are charged is referred to generally as departmentalization.
Departmentalization is intended to provide more accurate costing
27
of jobs and products by breaking down company or plant -wide
overhead rates into individual departmental overhead rates.
Properly established departmental overhead rates avoid distortions
to product costs which are introduced when plant-wide average
overhead rates are applied. [Ref. 13: p. 171]
The researcher examined two types of cost center arrangements.
The first type, consisting of output-oriented cost centers, was
based upon the researcher's perception of a spare parts cost
center as described by representatives of the Naval Supply Systems
Command when the research topic was proposed in February 1985.
Under this arrangement, other output-oriented, cost centers could
be established for the major defense systems as well as any major
commercial product lines being produced by the contractor.
The second type of cost center arrangement examined consisted
of cost centers categorized by manufacturing method. These cost
centers are functionally oriented and coincide with the major
methods of manufacturing utilized by a defense contractor. A
similar arrangement was proposed in June 1985 by an Air Force
Education With Industry team after spending a year with a major
defense contractor studying current accounting practices and
manufacturing automation [Ref. 14].
B. THE SPARE PARTS COST CENTER STRUCTURE
If operated along conventional lines as described, the spare
parts cost center would be the point of accumulation of all
costs, both direct and indirect, associated with the production
and processing of spare parts. If an assumption is made that the
28
center is responsible for all spare parts business for the contrac-
tor, this center would include three principal categories of
spare parts:
1. Parts manufactured by the contractor from raw materials
2. Parts manufactured by subcontractors and then modified by
the contractor prior to distribution to customers
3. Parts manufactured by subcontractors and then distributed
by the contractor to customers without modification
Figures 3.1 and 3.2 illustrate two possible cost flows for
the contractor if cost centers are established within the cost
accounting structure according to categories of output, such
as major weapon systems and spare parts. Under either of the two
structures, direct costs, distributions of service center costs,
and most indirect costs (formerly included in indirect cost
pools) are accumulated first in the cost centers and then distributed
to job orders. For direct costs, actual costs accumulated in
each cost center are charged to job orders as incurred. For indirect
costs, a set of cost pools, corresponding to those under the
current cost accounting system, are needed in each cost center to
allow periodic distribution of indirect costs to job orders based
upon causal and beneficial relationships between the costs and
the final cost objectives. Bases similar to those used in the
current accounting system, listed in Appendix D, are suitable for
allocating cost center overhead pools to final cost objectives.
A significant feature which distinguishes this cost center
structure from the contractor's present accounting structure is
the requirement for allocation methods and bases for distributing






UJ U Pia i-h |u



























































































the allocation method requires the contractor to identify in
quantitative terms the causal and beneficial relationships between
the categories of indirect costs and the cost centers.
If the contractor's operation is treated as a single business
unit as in Figure 3.1, Cost Accounting Standard (CAS) 410 requires
that the G&A costs be grouped in a separate indirect cost pool
and be allocated directly to final cost objectives [Ref. 15:pp.
205-206]. The G&A costs cannot be distributed first to the cost
centers, with each maintaining a separate G&A cost pool, and
then, to final cost objectives. As shown in Figure 3.1, the G«A
costs will not flow through the cost center, resulting in less than
a total accumulation of costs applicable to production output by
each cost center.
In figure 3.2, each cost center is treated as a business
unit. This structure allows the establishment of a GiA cost pool
which complies with CAS 410 within each cost center [Ref. 15].
Under this arrangement, each cost center accumulates all costs of
its production output. From a cost accounting perspective,
each cost center would function as a separate business. However,
for the contractor, physical production and engineering resources
such as manufacturing equipment, engineering design teams, and
the factory labor force, would be shared by all cost centers, since
spare parts business volume is insufficient to support separate
facilities and personnel dedicated to spare parts production and
processing [Ref. 9].
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C. AN ALTERNATIVE COST CENTER STRUCTURE
Figure 3.3 presents an alternative cost center structure in
which costs are accumulated in functionally-oriented cost centers
which coincide with the contractor's major methods of manufacturing.
This structure separates dissimilar manufacturing functions for
cost accumulation and allocation purposes. The process of distri-
buting costs to cost centers and service centers, as costs are
incurred, remains the same as described for the cost centers
established by category of output. Direct costs can be charged
to both cost centers and job orders as incurred. Indirect costs
can be accumulated, as incurred, in sets of cost pools within
each cost center, and periodically allocated to job orders using
bases similar to those established for the indirect cost pools
under the present accounting system.
The process of distributing indirect costs among cost centers
is less complex using the functionally-oriented cost centers than
using the output-oriented cost centers. For cost centers established
by manufacturing method, many readily identifiable costs do not
require allocation to all cost centers. The entire cost is
assigned to a single cost center. For example, operating, main-
tenance, and depreciation costs of an individual piece of production
equipment can be accumulated in a single cost center that is the
sole user of that equipment. Similarly, the direct labor costs
and associated indirect fringe benefits of employees who operate
that production equipment will be identified with a single cost
center rather than be spread among several cost centers based
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The indirect costs of dissimilar manufacturing processes, which
formerly had been included in plant-wide indirect cost pools, are
separated into sets of homogeneous indirect cost pools [Ref. 17:
p. 519]. These homogeneous indirect cost pools within each
functional cost center are distributed solely to job orders
processed by the cost center. For job orders which require
processing by two or more cost centers before complete production
output results, the costs incurred by each cost center are accum-
ulated independently. Indirect costs applied by each center are
based upon the direct inputs added by each center.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
A. ACCOUNTING ISSUES RELATED TO SPARE PARTS PRICING
Solutions to many aspects of the multifaceted spare parts
pricing problem have come from functional areas of the logistics
support field. Improvements related to requirements determination,
technical design, and source of supply have reduced the lingering
problem areas to those with no clear cut correct solution or over
which the parties to the spare parts pricing action— the defense
contractor, the DOD contracting officer, the requiring DOD activity,
and indirectly, Congress—cannot reach agreement.
The defense industry representatives identify, as the cause
of these problems, Cost Accounting Standards and cost regulations
which have specified the authorized means of cost accumulation
and recovery for DOD contractors. They say that the seemingly
high prices result from their compliance with these Standards and
regulations. The industry spokesmen say that this same situation
produces artificially low prices on other contracts. Their belief
is that the total price paid by DOD for all contracts is fair and
reasonable with the low prices on some contracts offsetting the
high prices on others. [Ref. 18: pp. 73-74]
On the other extreme, Congress charges that the defense
contractors are including costs in DOD contracts which should be
absorbed by the commercial business in which the contractor is
engaged. They contend that some of these costs would not have
been incurred in a competitive environment or that they should be
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covered by profit and not considered a cost of production for
government contracts. In support of this position. Congress is
considering legislation to expand and further definitize the list
of costs which are expressly unallowable as costs in government
contracts [Ref . 19: p. 263]
.
In the middle of the controversy, the DOD activities are
concerned about getting the products they need for mission accom-
plishment within a constrained budget. Which defense contract is
charged a high price is of major consequence to these activities
since obtaining additional funds, revising budgets, and justifying
cost overruns all require additional unbudgeted time and expense
which must be diverted from direct mission accomplishment.
Except for unallowable cost concerns, other remaining unresolved
spares pricing issues relate to the systems of cost accumulation
and allocation which drive the cost portion of spare parts prices.
These cost accounting issues may be divided into two major cate-
gories, accuracy of overhead rates and appropriateness of indirect
cost elements. The cost center concept offers a means of addressing
these issues. By breaking down non-homogeneous, plant-wide,
indirect cost pools into homogeneous, indirect cost pools by cost
center, the contractor may be able to establish overhead rates
which more accurately reflect indirect costs of each subunit
within the organization. Cost elements v/hich do not apply to
a subunit may be excluded from costs charged to that cost center
and spread over only those subunits to which the cost elements
contribute.
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B. ANALYSIS OF THE SPARE PARTS COST CENTER
1 . Accounting/Organ ization Structure Issues
In the sense of a traditional responsibility center, the
spare parts cost center is ineffective and offers no potential
improvements in terms of management control. Costs of spare
parts production and processing are incurred throughout tne
contractor's operation and are outside the control of the respon-
sibile cost center manager. Without physical plant facilities
and labor dedicated to spares production, the spare parts cost
center is simply a set of cost accounts into which spare parts
costs are funnelled as incurred by the contractor's functional
units.
The usefulness of the spare parts cost center for accurate
cost accumulation is questionable since new allocation methods
and bases are required to distribute indirect costs among cost
centers with further allocation required to distribute costs to
job orders. This added allocation step increases the probability
of introduction of inaccuracies in job order costs.
The objective of establishing cost centers or departments
is to improve the accuracy of job or product costing by breaking
down plant-wide overhead rates such that the averaging of costs
for dissimilar processes is eliminated [Ref. 17: p. 540], The
spare parts cost center does not satisfy this objective. The
indirect costs accumulated in each indirect cost pool for the spares
cost center are incurred by a multitude of functional activities.
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For example, the direct labor which serves as the base for manu-
facturing overhead for the contractor may have been incurred
by machine operators, manual assemblers, computer terminal operators,
or product inspectors and testers as shown by item 1 in Appendix
D. The resulting manufacturing overhead rate, which is used to
apply the indirect costs associated with manufacturing to job
orders, continues to be based upon aggregated costs for these
dissimilar functions.
2. Spare Pa rts Pricing Issues
Establishing a spare parts cost center will not solve any
of the remaining spare parts pricing problems. It does not
resolve either of the accounting issues— accuracy of overhead
rates and appropriateness of indirect cost elements. Since
indirect costs from all functional units of the contractor's
operation are accumulated in a single set of indirect cost pools
in the spares cost center, the resultant overhead rates remain an
average covering the whole plant and including all indirect cost
elements. Providing no improvement to the method of excluding
indirect cost elements from parts orders to which the elements do
not apply, the spare parts cost center offers no new avenues
toward pricing spare parts according to intrinsic value or the
level of effort expended by the contractor. The process of
allocating indirect costs to cost centers may introduce additional
inaccuracies, which are perpetuated in cost allocations to job
orders, since the output-oriented cost centers do not match the
division of work in the contractor's plant.
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Negotiation of overhead rates for forward pricing rate
agreements for spares pricing, based upon historical costs accu-
mulated in a spare parts cost center for this contractor, will
result in spare parts prices which are distorted in the same way
as the average overhead rates used for allocating costs to job
orders under the contractor's present system. Workload in nego-
tiating forward pricing rates for spare parts is increased using
a spare parts cost center. Rates must be negotiated for each
cost element as is done under the present system. However, in
addition, the negotiator must ascertain--using DCAA auditors or
his pricing staff--that distributions of costs among cost centers
have been performed properly and have not introduced inaccuracies
into cost center overhead rates.
Introduction of an additional structural layer increases
the complexity of the cost accounting system. Under the spares
cost center, with an additional accounting structure between cost
incurrence and final cost objectives, methods of establishing the
historical cost base, upon which spare parts prices are based,
are less direct than under the contractor's present system.
C. ANALYSIS OF THE ALTERNATIVE COST CENTER STRUCTURE
1 . Accounting/Organization Structure Issues
The functionally-oriented cost center structure in which
cost centers are established by major manufacturing method is a
useful management control structure. A defined body of production
resources can be placed under the control of a single cost center
manager who is responsible for cost incurrence as well as the
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quality of production output. This type of cost center arrangement
matches cost flow with work flow through the major manufacturing
processes applicable to the parts order. The cost accounting
system accumulates costs on a value added basis by cost center.
Indirect costs are accumulated in homogeneous cost pools in each
cost center, resulting in rates for allocating costs to job
orders which are more accurate in reflecting true costs incurred
for job accomplishment than those rates determined under either
the present system or the spare parts cost center.
The complexity of the cost accounting system is increased
using functionally-oriented cost centers since an additional
structural layer is introduced into the system. A scheme of
indirect cost distribution among cost centers must be devised.
This task is less difficult than setting up a similar system for
output-oriented cost centers since a number of costs will apply
to only one cost center, while others can be distributed using
such bases as headcount, facilities costs, or square footage of
work space, which will be more clearly defined for functionally-
oriented centers.
2. Spare Parts Pricing Issues
The functionally-oriented cost center structure presents
a possible means of correcting the unresolved accounting-related
spare parts pricing problems. The accuracy of overhead rates is
improved, while indirect - cost elements are able to be excluded
from cost centers to which they do not apply. Spare parts which
are priced using forward pricing rates based upon this more
accurate cost accounting structure will come closer to matching
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intrinsic value. The value added nature of cost accumulation
from cost center to cost center will facilitate tracking of costs
by contract auditors.
Breaking down the indirect costs into sets of homogeneous
cost pools within functional cost centers removes much of the
inaccuracy in cost accumulation which had been introduced through
the use of plant-wide average overhead rates. The value added in
terms of cost input by each major manufacturing unit for the
contractor will be recorded separately in the accounting records
and charged separately to job orders. Forward pricing rate
agreements negotiated based upon historical costs accumulated
infunctional cost centers will perpetuate the improved accuracy
by establishing overhead rates for each cost center. Tne nego-
tiation of the rates will be less complex with historical costs
accumulated in a logical form matching physical plant arrangement
and functional organization structure for major manufacturing
processes. Under the present accounting structure, analysis of
indirect costs for the purposes of establishing negotiated forward
pricing rates involves extensive "spread sheet" breakdowns of
historical costs to put costs in a format suitable for determining
accurate costs of eacn function to be priced.
The number of rates which must be negotiated for spares
pricing will increase substantially using cost centers with
separate sets of indirect cost pools. However, the rates will oe
applicable to all work performed by the cost center since costs
have been accumulated and rates established for the process, not
the type of output. Thus, a single rate agreement could be used
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to price all DOD contracts with the contractor which involved use
of any or all of the functional cost centers.
The difficult audit function, which v/as a major complication
associated with output-oriented cost centers, is still required
to determine that distributions of indirect costs among ccst
centers have been performed properly. The difficulty is reduced
for functionally-oriented cost centers since many indirect costs,
such as individual equipment operating costs and depreciation,
can be applied to a single cost center, rather than allocated to
all cost centers as was necessary under the output-oriented cost
center structure.
The ccst of improved parts pricing accuracy will be
reflected in increased administrative cost— included in the G&A
overhead rate—to maintain more detailed cost accounting records
which include the cost centers as an additional layer in the
accounting structure.
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS .
A. CONCLUSIONS
During analysis of the contractor's cost accounting system
and spare parts pricing methods, development of representative
cost center structures, and review of recent cost accounting and
spares pricing literature, the researcher reached a number of
conclusions concerning corporate cost accounting, spare parts
pricing and the interrelationships between these two activities.
1 - Three accounting issues contributed to the spare parts
pricing problems which were the subject of Congressional
hearings and media horror stories beginning in earlv 1983.
These issues were: the use of equal allocation techniques
for some indirect costs, the use of plant-wide overhead
rates to apply indirect costs to spare parts orders, and
the application of categories of indirect costs to spare parts
which received little or no benefit from the incurrence
of these costs.
2 - The first accounting issue— use of equal allocation tech-
niques—is no longer a problem. DOD policy now prohibits
the use of equal allocation techniques for allocating indirect
costs among line items of DOD contracts. Consistent enforce-
ment of the policy by all DOD components will prevent the
recurrence of this problem.
3 - Changes to the cost accounting system do not impact spare
parts prices directly . Such changes effect the accumulation
of costs into cost accounts which are the underlying support
for negotiated spare parts prices and forward pricing rate
agreements. Changes to the cost accounting system impact
the ability of defense auditors to examine details of cost
accounts and to determine the accuracy of proposed overhead
rates in matching true cost incurrence.
4 - A restructuring of the CO st accounting svstem bv category
of ou tpu t with mul t i cile cost cen ters. , including a spare
pa;rts cost center, is possible for the contractor stud ied
at cons iderabl e expense compared to benefits r ece ived
.
Introduction of such cost centers would require extensive
modification of the cost accounting system including record
and file structure and the computer software which supports
the system.
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5 - The spare parts cost center offers no improvements to the
cost accounting system which will resolve the remaining
accounti ng problems related to spare parts pricing. The
structure introduces additional opportunities for inaccuracies
in cost accumulation because of distribution of indirect
costs to cost centers which do not match either the functional
organization or the logical work flow and cost breakdown
for the contractor.
6 - A cost center structure which is functionally oriented.
possibly set up bv maior manufacturing method. may be a,
solution to the r emainin g accounting; problems related to
spares pricing . Such a structure would limit the averaging
of dissimilar categories of indirect costs by establishing
sets of indirect cost pools within each functional cost
center. Indirect cost categories which did not apply to a
cost center would not be included in that center.
7 - Changes to defense contractors' accounting systems are
needed to cope with the computerized manufacturing metnods
which have become more prevalent in modern defense manu-
facturing plants . Labor hours and labor dollars are
becoming obsolete as bases for allocating indirect costs
since direct labor cost is becoming a less significant
portion of total manufacturing cost. Recent studies by
an Air Force Education With Industry team and a major
defense contractor support this conclusion. These studies
indicate that a cost accounting system broken down into




1 - The NayaX Supply Systems Command should not advocate the
establishment of a spar e parts cost center within the cost
accounting structure of defense contractors as a means of
improving spare parts prices . An output-oriented cost
center structure which does not match functional manufacturing
processes and work flow provides no improvement over current
cost accounting structure for the contractor studied and
does not resolve any of the identified accounting issues
impacting spare parts prices.
2 - The Department of Defense should conduct research concerning
the general applicability of functionally-oriented cost centers
to the cost accounting structures of defense contractors .
For the contractor studied, such centers would provide a
means of improving the accuracy of costs which are applied
to spare parts job orders. These accumulated costs are the
basis for negotiating future forward pricing rates for
spare parts.
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3 - The Department of Defense should conduct research concerning
the optimal means of introducing the cost center structure
among defense contractors. D OD-wide. if found to be g enerally
a ppl icabl e . With no Cost Accounting Standards Board in
existence to promulgate a new standard in this area, DOD
appears to have two principal alternatives, issue a regulation
or propose legislation to Congress.
4 - The Naval SuppIv Systems Command, with concurrenc e from the
Chief of Naval Operations
r
should expand the sp are parts
breakout initiative to include those categories of parts
which have been excluded previously bv various Na vv systems
commands . Any additional services, such as inspection and
certification, which the Navy customer requires from a
major system integrating contractor, should be procured
utilizing a contractual arrangement separate from that
which is used to procure the parts. The costs of the
additional services may be considered more appropriately as
system costs, rather than as parts costs, since the inclusion
of the costs in parts prices increases the prices to some
amount above intrinsic value.
C. ADDRESSING THE RESEARCH QUESTION AND SUBSIDIARY QUESTIONS
1 . The Research Question
Would the establishment of a spare parts cost center
within the corporate accounting structure improve the process of
pricing spare parts so that the ultimate prices charged would be
consistent with the contractor's effort to produce thern? The
establishment of a spare parts cost center, although a feasible
accounting structure, will not improve the spare parts pricing
process for the contractor studied. The accuracy of cost accumu-
lation using a spare parts cost center would be no better than
that achieved under the present system and could be worse because
of the difficulty in determining the amount of costs to distribute
to each cost center or, specifically, to the spares cost center.
However, an alternative cost center structure, using functionally-
oriented cost centers-) may improve the accuracy of cost accumulation
within the contractor's job order cost accounting system oy
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separating into several sets of cost pools dissimilar costs
presently included in the contractor's single set of indirect
cost pools. The direct relationship between resources utilized
and output produced within each functionally-oriented cost center
decreases the opportunities for introduction of cost accumulation
inaccuracies.
2. The Subsidiary Questions
Would a spare parts cost cen ter fit into the existing
corporate accounting structure of the contractor ? Introduction
of a spare parts cost center requires an additional layer of
intermediate cost objectives within the contractor's existing
accounting structure. The contractor does not utilize cost
centers in the current structure. Cost centers could be established,
if desired, in the accounting structure.
What are the malor obstacles to establishing a spare
parts cost center ? The spare parts cost center, as an output-
oriented structure, is incompatible with the contractor's func-
tionally-oriented manufacturing operations. A system of distributing
indirect costs of each manufacturing function to the spares cost
center must be developed. This cost allocation system is more
complex and prone to inaccuracy than the allocation system presently
used, and still required in the new system, to allocate costs to
job orders. A second obstacle is the business environment in
which major defense contractors operate. Any cost accounting
system used must accumulate costs in such a way that products can
be priced competitively with other contractors if the contractor
is to remain in that segment of the market. Changes to the cost
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accounting system, which alter substantially the costs allocated
to each cost objective, will upset the contractor's competitive
position for the products in which his costs have been increased
and for those in which his costs have been decreased.
How would costs associated with manufacturing spare parts
under a separate cost center differ from costs determined under
the current acccounting structure ? The costs would be substantially
the same under a spares cost center as under the current structure.
Rates for allocating indirect costs to job orders would continue
to be averages of aggregated costs for dissimilar functions.
Would such a cost center comply with Cost Accounting
Standard s ? A cost center structure can be established which
complies with Cost Accounting Standards. The researcher identified
one defense contractor— a machine tool manufacturer—which presently
uses a cost center structure [Ref. 51. The Air Force Education
With Industry team also concluded that establishment of a cost
center structure, to cope with increasing factory automation, did




What inc entives might be provided to POD contractors to
motivate them t o adopt this accounting structure. if feasible and
advantageous ? The spares cost center is feasible but not advan-
tageous. It should not be adopted by defense contractors whose
operation is organized similarly to the contractor studied. The
alternative structure is both feasible and advantageous, from
DOD s perspective. However, in the present business environment,
a DOD contractor can adopt this structure only if its competitors
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adopt it at the same time or if DOD provides direct compensation
to the contractor which offsets any competitive disadvantage
caused by its adopting the structure. Direct compensation would
defeat the purpose of adopting the cost center structure by
reintroducing the cost inaccuracies in the form of compensation
for business loss. The only reasonable methods identified by the
researcher of motivating contractors to adopt the structure are
through DOD mandate— a new cost regulation—or through Congressional
action— a new law. Either method would put all contractors on
equal footing and not put any contractors at a competitive dis-
advantage. However, a gradual phase-in period may be necessary
to limit opportunities for competitive advantage. The Air Force
Education With Industry team placed considerable emphasis upon
the need for a gradual change, rather than an abrupt change, to
accounting practices [Ref. 14: pp. 12-133.
What effect would the establ ishment of a s eparate cost
center for spar e parts have on the contractor's ability to recover
overhead costs ? Establishing a cost center structure of any type
would not impact upon the contractor's ability to recover overhead
costs. However, some overhead costs may shift from being allocated
to commercial contracts to being allocated to government contracts
and vice versa. Overhead costs may shift also among various govern-
ment contracts for products which rely upon different manufacturing
methods.
Would the establishm ent of a separate cost center for
spare parts lead to anv cost efficiencies, such as reductions in
total o verhead costs ? For contractors with accounting structures
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similar to that used by the contractor studied, the spares cost
center will increase total overhead costs because of the increased
administrative cost associated with a more complex accounting
system. Increased administrative cost is characteristic also of
the alternative structure. Under either structure, the shifting
of indirect costs between commercial and government contracts is
likely, although the net result for the government may be either
a cost increase or a cost decrease.
What would be the implications concerning present corporate
structure and/or management practices of establishing a separate
cost center for spare parts cost accumulation? The spare parts
cost center would fragment costs of operating functional manu-
facturing subunits into parts which are not readily traceable to
clearly defined activities which resulted in cost incurrence. The
spares cost center would be unmanageable from a responsibility
center perspective since costs charged to the center are not
controllable by the cost center manager. The alternative structure
would more closely match functional organization structure.
Indirect costs could be traced to specific activities within the
cost center which resulted in cost incurrence. The cost center
manager would be in a position to control costs under the alternative
structure with both specific assets and a definite body of employees
under his management.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY
This research effort was focused on a single defense contractor,
that contractor's cost accounting system, and pricing of a small
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part of the contractor's total defense contracting business.
Although the researcher was able to identify a number of areas
which appeared to have general application, no definite conclusions
concerning the general applicability of functionally-oriented
cost centers to all major defense contractors could be reached.
Future research should focus on the similarities and differences
in cost accounting structures among major defense contractors and
the impact these would have upon general applicability of func-
tionally-oriented cost centers. This paper concludes that a
spare parts cost center is not a useful accounting structure for
improving spare parts prices for the defense contractor studied
or for other contractors with an accounting structure similar to
that used by the contractor studied. Future efforts may be
directed toward identifying defense contractors which include
output-oriented cost centers, such as the spare parts cost center,
in their accounting structures and determining the effectiveness
of the cost centers as structures for accumulating accurate costs




1. Allocable Cost: A cost assignable or chargeable to one or
more cost objectives in accordance with the relative benefits
received or other equitable relationships defined or agreed
to between contractual parties. [Ref. 7: p. 1A-B1]
2. Allocate: To assign an item of cost, or a group of items
of cost, to one or more cost objectives. This term includes
both direct assignment of cost and the reassignment of a
share from an indirect cost pool. [Ref. 15: p. 111]
3. Allowable Cost: A cost which meets the tests of reason-
ableness, allocabil i ty , is in consonance with standards
promulgated by the Cost Accounting Standards Board (if
applicable), or otherwise conforms to generally accepted
accounting principles, specific limitations or exclusions
set forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulation or agreed-to
terms between contractual parties. [Ref. 7: p. 1A-B23
4. Breakout: The formal process of identifying parts that are
currently bought sole source from a prime contractor that
could be bought either directly from the supplier who makes
them, or competitively from two or more suppliers. [Ref.
20: p. 3]
5. Cost Accounting System: The extension of the systematic
recording of financial transactions reflected in the general
accounting system, and controlled by or reconciled thereto,
for the purpose of disclosing the material, labor, and
burden costs of manufacturing and selling a product. [Ref.
21:p. 191]
6. Cost Input: The cost, except G & A expenses, which for
contract costing purposes is allocable to the production of
goods and services during a cost accounting period. [Ref.
15: p. 111 ]
7. Cost Objective: A function, organizational subdivision,
contract or other work unit for which cost data are desired
and for which provision is made to accumulate and measure
the cost of processes, products, jobs, and capitalized
projects. [Ref. 15:p. 111]
8. Direct Cost: Any cost which is identified specifically
with a particular final cost objective. Direct costs are
not limited to items which are incorporated in the end
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product as material or labor. Costs identified specifically
with other final cost objectives of the contractor are
direct costs of those cost objectives. [Ref. 15:p. 111]
9. Final Cost Objective: A cost objective which has allocated
to it both direct and indirect costs, and, in the contractor's




10. Formula Pricing: A pricing method which distributes costs
systematically over all items using factors such as labor
rates, overhead rates, scrap rates, and profit which are
negotiated with the contractor, and then applied to a base
such as an agreed upon number of labor hours or the cost of
materials. [Ref. 6:p. 28]
11. Forward Pricing Agreement : A written understanding negotiated
between a contractor and the Government to make certain
rates (such as labor, indirect, material usage and spare
parts provisioning) available for use during a specified
period of time in pricing contracts or contract modifications.
[Ref. 7: p. 1A-B10]
12. General and Administrative (G&A) Expense: Any management,
financial, and other expense which is incurred by or allocated
to a business unit and which is for the general management
and administration of the business unit as a whole. G&A
expense does not include those management expenses whose
beneficial or causal relationship to cost objectives can be
more directly measured by a base other than a cost input
base representing the total activity of a business unit
during a cost accounting period. [Ref. 1 5
:
p . 111A]
13. Indirect Cost: Any cost not directly identified with a
single final cost objective, but identified with two or
more objectives or with at least one intermediate cost
objective. Also referred to as overhead or burden. [Ref.
15:p. 112.]
14. Indirect Cost Pool: A grouping of incurred costs identified
with two or more objectives but not identified specifically
with any final cost objective. [Ref. 1 5
:
p. 112]
15. Intrinsic Value: The estimated or appraised worth or price
based upon the real nature and inherent characteristics of
a thing, and not dependent on external circumstances.
16. Job Order Cost System: One in which a contractor accounts
for output and costs incurred by specifically identifiable
physical units. A job order may cover the production of
one unit or represent a composite of a number of identical
units. [Ref. 7: p. 1A-B11]
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17. Pricing: The process of establishing the amount or amounts
to be paid in return for goods or services. [Ref. 15: p.
113]
18. Proposal: Any offer or other submission used as a basis
for pricing a contract, contract modification or termination
settlement or for securing payments thereunder. [Ref. 15:
p. 1131
19. Spare Parts: Spares and repair parts, repairable and
consumable, purchased for use in the maintenance, overhaul,
and repair of equipment such as ships, tanks, guns, aircraft,
missiles, ground communication and electronic systems,
ground support and associated test equipment. ...it includes
items, spares, repair parts, parts, subassemblies, components,
and subsystems, but excludes end items such as aircraft,





1. Repairs & Maintenance of Special Tooling and Special Test
Equipment
Major Cost Elements: Direct labor, Material, other direct costs
and applicable overhead incurred
Base: Direct labor hours charged to projects by each organization
assigned to the Production Overhead Pool Burden Center
2. Common Quality Service
Major Cost Elements: Direct labor and applicable overhead incurred
in connection with mechanical receiving inspection and supporting
tests & analyses on common inventory items as well as common
manufacturing process inspection and process control engineering
and testing
Base: Direct labor hours charged to projects by each organization
assigned to the Production Overhead Pool Burden Center
3. Common Manufacturing Planning
Major Cost Elements: Direct labor & applicable overhead relating
to performance of the following tasks:
(a) Liaison planning
(b) Planning documentation audit
(c) Manufacturing assembly parts listings
Base: Direct labor hours charged to projects by each organization
assigned to the Production Overhead Pool Burden Center
4. Common Minor Material
Major Cost Elements: Miscellaneous small parts, fabricating
materials and minor supplier charges
Base: Direct labor hours charged to projects by manufacturing
organizations
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5. Common Manufacturing Processing
Major Cost Elements: Direct Labor & applicable overhead relating
to the performance of batched processes or operations
Base: Manufacturing Standard hours for completed projects in
each manufacturing processing cost center
Indirect Service Centers
1. Computer Services
Major Cost Elements: Direct labor, applied overhead, machine
costs, software, supplies, and communication costs
Base: Computer usage units calculated by algorithm
2. User Dedicated Equipment
Major Cost Elements: Direct labor, applied overhead, machine
costs, software, supplies, and communication costs
Base: Equipment by type, assigned to custodial organization.
3. Labor for Indirect Computer Application Support
Major Cost Elements: Labor and applied overhead





Major Cost Elements: Indirect labor, fringe benefits, and other
indirect costs of divisional general management offices
Base: Headcount for each division as assigned to the various
overhead pools
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2. Plant services, Equipment Maintenance
Major Cost Elements: Indirect labor, fringe benefits, and other
costs associated with the maintenance, repair and modfication
of company and Government-owned equipment other than special
tooling and special test equipment
Base: Equipment Cost (original book cost)
3. Plant Services, Building Maintenance
Major Cost Elements: Indirect labor, fringe benefits, depreciation
and rental costs, plant rearrangement, repair and maintenance,
utilities, taxes and insurance
Base: Square feet of space occupied
4. Plant Services, Telephone & Telegraph
Major Cost Elements: Indirect labor, fringe benefits, materials,
telephones, telegraph equipment
Base: Number of lines installed
5. Plant Services, Furniture & Fixtures
Major Cost Elements: Indirect labor, fringe benefits, materials,
office furniture & fixtures
Base: Headcount
6. Plant Services, Traffic & Transportation
Major Cost Elements: Indirect labor, fringe benefits, insurance,
transportation, and other indirect costs incurred
Ease: Square feet of space occupied
7. Industrial Relations
Major Cost Elements: Inoirect labor, fringe benefits, education
and training, employee relocation, recruiting expenses, and
other costs of the company industrial relations organization




Major Cost Elements: Indirect labor, fringe benefits, records
management and mail services.
Ease: Headcount
9. Industrial Security
Major Cost Elements: Indirect labor, fringe benefits, and other
indirect costs incurred by the industrial security, fire
protection and safety organizations
Ease: Headcount
10. Material Handling, Inventory Functions
Major Cost Elements: Indirect labor, fringe benefits, and other
indirect costs of stores receiving, status and control and
inventory adjustments
Base: Receiving memos closed as identified to requesting organi-
zation
11. Sales and Use Tax
Major Cost Elements: State and municipal sales and use tax
Base: Cost incurred in taxable overhead accounts bv orcanization
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4. Outside production and services
5. Common Minor Materials and parts
6. Vendor rework and processing costs
7. Gases
a. Special gases
b. Standard gases, when they become part of the end item and
are measureable
8. Recording paper - when distributed by roll and identifiable
to a project requirement





Major Cost Elements: Indirect labor, fringe benefits of both
direct and indirect employees, equipment costs and depreciation,
occupancy costs, taxes, supplies, insurance and corporate
allocations of operations office
Base: Direct labor dollars of manufacturing, product assurance,
systems test and other support organizations
2. Engineering (Development)
Major Cost Elements: Indirect labor, fringe benefits of both
direct and indirect employees, indirect travel, indirect data
processing, occupancy costs, taxes, supplies, insurance,
equipment costs and corporate allocation of science and
engineering offices
Base: Direct labor dollars of engineering, development testing,
logistics, research, product support, development and other
support organizations
3. Off-site (Remote Site)
Major Cost Elements: Fringe benefits, computer costs, payroll
taxes and indirect labor
Base: Direct labor dollars of respective remote organizations
assigned to each pool
4. Procurement Burden
Major Cost Elements: Indirect labor, fringe benefits, occupancy
costs, travel and other costs associated with purchasing and
subcontract administration




Major Cost Elements: Indirect labor, fringe benefits, data
processing, occupancy costs, taxes, supplies, insurance,
equipment, independent research and development, bid and
proposal costs, and corporate management allocation
Base: Direct labor dollars charged to final cost objectives
6. Information Processing (Scientific and business computer
services)
Major Cost Elements: Management, supervision, indirect labor,
fringe benefits, training, travel, occupancy costs
Base: Direct labor dollars of employees in information processing
organizations
7. Cost of Money (CAS 414)
Major Cost Elements: Computed in accordance with CAS 414
Base: Same base as is used to allocate other indirect expenses
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